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Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 AMMAN 4082

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, JO, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: JORDAN, THE WEST BANK, TRANSITION AND PEACE--
AN ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY: THIS CABLE LOOKS AT THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
IMPORTANT TO JORDAN IN JOINING NEGOTIATIONS.
JORDAN, IN JOINING ANY NEGOTIATIONS, WILL
BE MOST SENSITIVE TO HOW THE QUESTION OF
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY IS TO BE WORKED OUT.
(THIS IS IN ADDITION TO A NUMBER OF OTHER IMPORTANT
ISSUES MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS AND RELATED
TO JORDAN'S OVERALL CONFIDENCE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS
IS REALLY GOING SOMEWHERE.) THIS WILL BE ITS PRIMARY
SUBSTANTIVE PREOCCUPATION. SELF-DETERMINATION WILL
ALSO BE IMPORTANT, BUT WE FEEL THERE ARE SOME WAYS WHICH
CAN BE FOUND TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN CHOICES WHICH
DO NOT INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT STATE OPTION AND THOSE
WHICH DO. REGARDING A TRANSITIONAL REGIME, JORDAN
SEES THIS AS A STAGE IN A FIXED PROCESS, NOT A
PERIOD DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE.
AS A RESULT JORDAN WILL BE LOATHE TO ACCEPT A
TRANSITIONAL REGIME, AND WITH IT THE ACCEPTANCE
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OF CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL, WITH-
OUT GETTING IN RETURN RATHER FIRM COMMITMENTS ON
THE SHAPE OR FRAMEWORK OF THE TERRITORIAL (AND
SELF-DETERMINATION) ARRANGEMENTS FROM ISRAEL
(AND THE UNITED STATES). JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY,
IN SUCH A CONTEXT, AND IF RESPECTABLE PALESTINIANS
COULD ALSO BE FOUND TO GO ALONG, AGREE TO MOST

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OF THE OTHER NECESSARY TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.
END SUMMARY

1. FOR SOME MONTHS THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF THE WEST BANK, ITS PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS, JORDAN, AND THE POSSIBLE SHAPE OF THE PEACE. THE EFFORT HAS BEEN TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEMS, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MAINLY JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE WHICH WE KNOW BEST, FACTOR IN THE OTHER VIEWS AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, AND THEN SEE WHERE THIS TAKES US IN TERMS OF ANSWERS. IN THE COURSE OF THIS EFFORT WE HAVE PREPARED INTERNAL PAPERS ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WHICH WE WILL FORWARD TO NEA--"THE WEST BANK--BORDERS AND SECURITY MEASURES;" "SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS;" AND "CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (AND POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS THEREOF) FOR A POSSIBLE JORDAN-WEST BANK/GAZA LINKAGE." WE DRAW ON SOME OF THE THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THOSE PAPERS IN THIS CABLE.

2. JORDAN'S VIEW: THE JORDANIANS HAVE A RATHER SIMPLE, NON-COMPLEX VIEW OF THE SHAPE OF A FUTURE SETTLEMENT WHICH IS SUBJECT TO QUESTIONS AND GAPS.

3. TERRITORY: BASICALLY THE JORDANIANS WANT THE MAXIMUM RETURN OF TERRITORY. THEY ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS RECIPROCALLY. THEY MAY ALSO BE WILLING TO AGREE TO AN ALLON PLAN ARRANGEMENT AS THE FIRST, OR EARLY STAGE OF A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT AS THE FINAL POSITION. JERUSALEM MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY FINAL PLAN. TERRITORIAL CHANGES SHOULD INVOLVE THE ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY WHICH MIGHT WELL TRADE TERRITORY FOR TERRITORY, OR ALTERNATIVELY TERRITORY FOR NON-TERRITORIAL ADVANTAGE, (E.G., CORRIDOR TO GAZA, ACCESS TO HAIFA PORT).

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

4. SELF-DETERMINATION: THE JORDANIANS HAVE CHAMPIONED THE IDEA OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED POLITICALLY OF SELLING THEIR BROTHERS DOWN THE RIVER, AND ARE THEREFORE AGAINST TOO LIMITED A SERIES OF CHOICES, (E.G., EXCLUDING THE "INDEPENDENT STATE" OPTION). IN THE LONG RUN, IF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IMPOSED IT ON THEM (WITH PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT OF SOME SORT) THEY MIGHT ACCEPT RELUCTANTLY THE IDEA OF A LIMITED CHOICE IN SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT NOT HAPPILY.

5. TRANSITIONAL REGIME: JORDAN HAS SUPPORTED FOR SOME TIME THE NOTION OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME AND SPECIFICALLY OF A NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL REGIME TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR SELF-DETERMINATION. IT HAS FELT THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE A PART OF THIS REGIME AND NEITHER SHOULD ISRAEL TO AVOID PREJUDICING THE END RESULT OF ELECTIONS. KING REMAINS CERTAIN REALLY FREE ELECTIONS WOULD END IN FAVOR OF LINKS WITH JORDAN; OTHERS ARE MORE SKEPTICAL THAT THE CONDITIONS OF "REAL FREEDOM" COULD BE MET, OR THE END RESULTS MADE SO CERTAIN.
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6. PEACE: WHILE THERE IS A CERTAIN ELUSIVE QUALITY TO JORDAN'S STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT, WE BELIEVE JORDAN IS WILLING TO MEET MOST OF ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRUE PEACE, IF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED. THE QUESTION HOWEVER OF ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL HAS NEVER BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE JORDANIANS, EVEN IN MEANINGFUL INTERNAL DISUCSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THE CROWN PRINCE SEEMS MORE VENTURESOME IN THIS AREA.

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7. KEY ISSUES IN TRANSITIONAL REGIME FOR WEST BANK/GAZA: FROM THE JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE, AND LOOKING TOWARD JORDAN'S JOINING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ARE THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES (AS OPPOSED TO PROCEDURAL, POLITICAL OR ASSISTANCE ISSUES WHICH WE HAVE ADDRESSED PREVIOUSLY).

A) TERRITORY-- JORDAN, REFLECTING OTHER ARAB OPINION AS WELL AS ITS OWN STRONG VIEWS, WILL CLEARLY WANT THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE COMMITMENT PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS KEY ISSUE. THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S RESISTANCE TO THE APPLICATION OF 242 WITH ITS WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS TO "ALL FRONTS" HAS HEIGHTENED THIS INTEREST. WHILE TACTICALLY A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES REPEATING THE LANGUAGE OF 242 IN THE ABSTRACT WITH THE PREVIOUS LABOR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY TO JORDAN, NOW THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED. ANY DECLARATION WHICH GOES ONLY AS FAR AS 242 WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIA-TIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH MADE MORE EXPLICIT THE APPLICATION OF WITHDRAWAL TO THAT

TERRITORY. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE PRIVATE SIDE AGREEMENTS ON THIS POINT AMONG THE PARTIES AND THE U.S. EVEN THESE SORTS OF COMMITMENTS WOULD RAISE PROBLEMS. THE PUBLIC POSITION CHAM-PIONED BY SADAT--WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY--HAS PUT JORDAN INTO A STRAIT JACKET. SINCE SADAT HAS A "COMMITMENT" FROM BEGIN TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OF SINAI, HE AND EGYPT ARE ALREADY COVERED FULLY IF THE ISSUES OF THE AIR BASES, SETTLEMENTS, DEMILITARIZATION, ETC., CAN BE WORKED OUT. SADAT IN EFFECT HAS SET EQUALLY-HIGH STANDARDS FOR JORDAN, WHICH JORDAN SUSPECTS HE MIGHT LATER COVER WITH AMBIGUITY, AND THUS JORDAN WOULD BE LEFT HOLDING SOMEONE ELSE'S BAG AND WITH A GREAT DEAL LESS FLEXIBILITY. JORDAN NOW SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS, PARTICULARLYIF THE U.S. (WHOSE GENUINE SUPPORT HERE WILL MEAN MORE THAN ALL OF THE DECLARATIONS AND GUIDELINES) IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE IDEA FULLY.

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NODIS CHEROKEE

UNFORTUNATELY, RATHER THAN AS SADAT SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT
HUSSEIN IS AFRAID TO DO HIS OWN NEGOTIATING, SADAT HAS HELPED
IN PART TO UP THE ANTE WHICH MAKES HUSSEIN LESS
AND LESS INCLINED TO JOIN THE GAME. NEVERTHELESS,
A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH LEFT THE ISSUE
OF TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL VAGUE, OR AS A PART OF A
PROCESS OF REVIEW ON OTHER LESS-PRECISE GROUNDS,
WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT AND MASSIVE BARRIER
TO JORDAN'S JOINING IN THE EFFORT. THUS THE FIRST
AND PRIMARY REQUIREMENT FOR JORDAN JOINING THE
PROCESS IS SOME REAL MEASURE OF CLARITY ON THE
ISSUE OF ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE FOR
FINAL BORDERS AND OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA
THAT THOSE BORDERS SHOULD BE THE 1967 LINES
WITH MINOR RECTIFICATIONS.

B) SELF-DETERMINATION -- AS INDICATED EARLIER,
OUR FEELINGS ARE THAT JORDAN WILL STICK ON THIS
POINT, BUT NOT NEARLY SO STRONGLY AS ON TERRITORY,
AND THAT THERE IS MORE THAN ONE WAY TO BELL
THIS CAT. WE THINK THAT JORDAN WOULD ATTEMPT TO
NEGOTIATE A FREE RANGE OF CHOICES FOR THE WEST
BANK PALSSTINIANS IN ANY ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.
THESE CHOICES WOULD INCLUDE A CONFEDERATION WITH
JORDAN AND AN INDEPENDENT STATE. HOWEVER, GIVEN
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THE ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER ANY POSSIBILITY
OF THE INDEPENDENCE OPTION AT THE PRESENT TIME,
WE SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF JORDAN GETTING WHAT IT WANTS
IN TERMS OF THE CHOICES. AND INDEED JORDAN CLEARLY DOES NOT
WANT THE INDEPENDENCE OPTION ITSELF TO WIN. THE PRESENT STATE OF

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ARAB POLITICS IS WHAT FORCES IT TO CONSIDER AND PRESS FOR THE
POINT. IN EFFECT, IT IS THE PRICE WHICH JORDAN
HAS TO PAY FOR THE RABAT SUMMIT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER,
IF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE CAN BE WORKED OUT, IN
ITSELF THE NEXUS OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS,
WE BELIEVE THAT SOME LESS THAN PERFECT COMPROMISE
OPTION COULD BE SOLD TO OR FORCED UPON JORDAN.
WE HAVE CONSIDERED A RANGE OF THESE OPTIONS AND
BELIEVE THAT THEY MIGHT COVER A SPAN OF ALTERNATIVES.
AT ONE EXTREME WOULD BE THE OPTION WHICH WOULD
POSTULATE THE CHOICES WE HAVE VOICED PUBLICLY--
(A) CONTINUING THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS;
(B) LINKS WITH ISRAEL; OR (C) LINKS WITH JORDAN.
ANOTHER IS A VARIANT OF THIS WHICH WOULD POSTULATE
A TWO-STAGE PROCESS: (A) STAGE ONE (SAY AFTER FIVE
YEARS) WOULD ALLOW FOR A CHOICE OF LINKS WITH ISRAEL
OR LINKS WITH JORDAN, FOLLOWED BY A (B) SECOND STAGE
AFTER ANOTHER FIVE YEARS WHICH WOULD ALLOW
FOR LINKS WITH WHICHEVER STATE WAS CHOSEN
IN STAGE ONE--WE PRESUME JORDAN--OR AN
INDEPENDENT STATE. IN EFFECT THIS WOULD PERMIT
JORDAN, BY THE CHOICE OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA INHABITANTS, TO
BECOME THE SECOND STAGE TRANSITIONAL MANAGER OF
THE AREA. WE PRESUME JORDAN'S GOOD
BEHAVIOR WOULD HELP TO GUARANTEE THE RESULTS OF
THE SECOND STAGE, BUT THE OPEN CHOICE WOULD AT
LEAST THEORETICALLY BE THERE. A VARIANT COULD
BE TO ALLOW THE SECOND STAGE TO TAKE PLACE ONLY
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IF A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF THE INHABITANTS WERE
TO PETITION FOR SUCH A SECOND ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION--
SAY 30 PERCENT OF THE ELIGIBLE ELECTORATE. A
THIRD OPTION MIGHT BE TO ADJUST THE CHOICE SO THAT THE
INDEPENDENCE OPTION CARRIED WITH IT GREATER TIME,
TERRITORIAL AND ISRAELI-CONTINUING-SECURITY-
PRESENCE CONSTRAINTS FOR THE PALESTINIANS, WHILE
A CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN WOULD BE MORE
GENEROUS TO THE WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS. THE
THEORY WOULD ACCEPT THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT
THE INDEPENDENT STATE WAS MORE DANGEROUS TO IT
AND THUS SHOULD BE MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED. THIS
MIGHT MEAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOMETHING AS
TRUNCATED AS THE ALLON PLAN WOULD BE POSSIBLEIF
THE INHABITANTS CHOSE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, OR
EVEN A KING OF JERICHO, HEBRON, NABLUS,
RAMALLAH "BALLOON"; THE ALTERNATIVE WHICH WE PREFER WOULD
BE A CONFEDERATION OF JORDAN WITH THE WEST BANK/GAZA TERRITORY
BASED ON MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS FROM THE 1967 LINES.

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NODIS CHEROKEE

A THIRD OPTION-- A WEST BANK/GAZA,
ISRAEL, JORDAN CONDOMINIUM OR CONFEDERATION,
ONCE DEAR TO THE HEART OF PERES, MIGHT ALSO BE
OFFERED TO COMPLETE THE CONTIMUUM OF CHOICES
ALTHOUGH AT THIS POINT IT WOULD SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS. THESE CHOICES MIGHT ALL
TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD,
SAY AFTER FIVE YEARS, BUT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO
BE AGREED IN OUTLINE AT LEAST IN ORDER TO GET THE
TRANSITON PERIOD STARTED. IN ANY CASE, JORDAN IS CERTAINLY
NOT LIKELY TO AGREE TO A SET OF TRANSITION ARRANGE-
MENTS WITHOUT A BASIC COMMITMENT BY ISRAEL TO
TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN
BROAD OUTLINE.

8. OTHER ISSUES RALATED TO A TRANSITIONAL REGIME
OF CONCERN TO JORDAN--WE HAVE NOTED ABOVE THAT
JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED (1) THAT THE ISRAELIS
WERE REALLY GOING TO WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORY
AND (2) THAT THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT A MAJOR WITHDRAWAL
TOGETHER WITH A FAIRLY GENUINE APPLICATION OF
SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE PALESTINIANS, BEFORE JORDAN WOULD AGREE
TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. IN ADDITION,
WE BELIEVE JORDAN WOULD WANT TO BE SATISFIED ON
THE NEARLY FINAL SHAPE OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND SOME
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OF THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF HOW SELF-DETERMINATION
WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE AGREEING TO GO INTO A TRANSITON
PERIOD. THE TRANSITION ITSELF MIGHT STILL BE A TIME FOR
NEGOTIATION, BUT JORDAN WOULD
CERTAINLY STRIVE TO DEVELOP MAXIMUM LEVERAGE IN
ADVANCE TO ENSURE (1) THAT THE TRANSITION PERIOD
NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING SOMEWHERE AND (2) THAT THE
FINAL OUTLINE OR SHAPEIWAS REASONABLY WELL DETERMINED
AHEAD OF TIME. JORDAN'S LIKELY VIEWS ON OTHER TRANSITION PERIOD
ARRANGMENTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) TIME PERIOD FOR TRANSITION-- JORDANIANS
WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE
TIME PERIOD--THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED SIX
MONTHS TO A YEAR. THEY MAY EVENTUALLY COME TO ACCEPT
A LONGER PERIOD (3-5 YEARS);

(B) INCLUSION OF PALESTINIANS IN THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS--JORDAN WILL FAVOR INCLUSION OF PALESTINIANS.
IT WOULD ACCEPT THE IDEA OF PLO REPRESENTATIVES
ALTHOUGH NOT WITH GREAT ENTHUSIASM. IT WOULD
PROBABLY ALSO ACCEPT WEST BANK/GAZAN REPRESENTATIVES
WITH OR WITHOUT PLO REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THIS WOULD
ALSO DEPEND ON THE VIEW OF OTHER ARABS;

(C) THE JORDANIANS WOULD FAVOR AN INTERNATIONAL
REGIME DURING THE TRANSITION. THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO PERMITTING THE WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS MAXIMUM
CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS;

(D) JORDAN WOULD AGREE NOT TO ASSERT ITS OWN
CLAIMS FOR SOVEREIGNTY DURING TRANSITION; IT WOULD
TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY IS ALREADY
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VESTED IN THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION WHOSE WILL
IS TO BE EXPRESSED THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION;

(E) JORDAN WOULD EVENTUALLY (AND WITH DIFFCULTY)
AGREE TO ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES REMAINING DURING
THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN LIMITED AND SPECIFIED
LOCATIONS PREFERABLY AS PART--AT LEAST FORMALLY--OF AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

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NODIS CHEROKEE

JORDAN COULD ALSO AGREE TO PERMANENT
DEMILITARIZATION, ADJACENT ZONES OF LIMITED
ARMAMENT (PERHAPS EVEN IN THE EAST BANK),
OBSERVATION STATIONS, INTERNATIONAL FORCES, AND
PERHAPS THE USE OF "OTHER SIDE" VERIFICATION
AND OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES IN CONJUNCTION WITH BIG POWER, UN
AND LOCAL STATE PARTICIPATION AS PART OF THE
TRANSITIONAL AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT;

(F) JORDAN WOULD NOT WANT TO INTRODUCE ITS
MILITARY PRESENCE INTO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
UNDER A TRANSITIONAL REGIME AND PROBABLY ONLY
RELUCTANTLY IN A PERMANENT SETTLEMTN. SOME
REQUEST BY LEGITIMATE WEST BANK AND GAZAN AUTHORITIES
MIGHT CHANGE THE JORDANIAN VIEW;

(G) JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO SEE CAREFUL CONTROL
EXERCISED OVER REFUGEES RESETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
TO ENSURE SECURITY, PERMIT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PREVENT
IRREDENTISM, AND TO AVOID JEOPARDIZING THE
FINAL AGREEMENT. JORDAN, IF GIVEN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AID FOR THE PURPOSE, WOULD PROBABLY RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO
RESETTLE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER (200,000-400,000) OF
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES ON THE EAST BANK.

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(H) JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY INSIST THAT IF
ISRAELIS ARE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE LAND
FREELY WITHOUT ANY ADMINISTRATIVE OR LEGAL
HINDRANCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, THAT
ARABS BE GIVEN THE SAME RIGHTS WITHIN ISRAEL,
INCLUDING A REQUIREMENT THAT ISRAEL MODIFY ITS

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PRESENT STRICTURES AGAINST THE INALIENABILITY OF
THE LARGE AMOUNTS OF LAND NOW HELD BY THE JEWISH
AGENCY AS THE ARABS NOW UNDERSTAND THE CASE. THE
END RESULT WOULD LIKELY BE A VERY CIRCUMSCRIBED
RIGHT FOR NATIONALS OF EITHER AREA TO PURCHASE
LAND IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. JORDAN WOULD
NOT PERMIT ISRAELIS SUCH A RIGHT IN THE EAST BANK, EVEN IF
IT WERE LINKED TO OR CONFEDERATED WITH THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA.

9. IN CONCLUSION--THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE
STUMBLING BLOCKS IN TERMS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
TO JORDAN'S JOINING NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE DIFFERING
IDEAS ON TERRITORIAL RETURN--FAR AND AWAY THE
MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE--AND THE APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THERE ARE OTHER
POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AS WELL WHICH SURROUND
IDEA OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME. JORDAN IS LIKELY
TO BE MOST WARY OF AGREEING TO A TRANSITIONAL
REGIME WITHOUT PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ALSO, AND
WITHOUT A QUITE FIRM SENSE OF CERTAINTY THAT THE TERRITORIAL
AND SELF-DETERMINATION ISSUES ARE REALLY GOING TO BE NEGOTIATED.
JORDAN WILL LOOK WITH DISFAVOR ON THE IDEA THAT,
SINCE A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED
NOW ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGE-
MENT SHOULD BE AGREED TO--UNLESS THAT TRANSITIONAL
ARRANGEMENT FULLY PROTECTS JORDAN'S POSITION ON

A NUMBER OF VITAL ISSUES (PARTICULARLY TERRITORY).
OTHERWISE, JORDAN WILL SEE THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGE-
MENT, AS IT NOW SEES THE BEGIN PLAN, MERELY AS A
DEVICE FOR FURTHER ENTRENCHING ISRAELI CONTROL
OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE
OF THE ARABS, WHILE LEAVING THE ISSUES IMPORTANT
TO THE ARABS TO BE SETTLED OVER TIME AND WITHOUT
A CLEAR FRAMEWORK SET FOR THAT PROCESS.
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